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ABSTRACT
We present historical examples of new forms of money that can be corn—
pared with the ECU. We first define the ECU in its official role before
turning to developments in the private market for ECUs. We then examine
historical antecedents of three attributes of ECUs: a unit of account; a
basket of currencies; a basis for monetary integration. We discuss which
features if any of ECUs are unique, and the contribution of the historical
analysis to assessing the future of ECUs. We then ask whether governments
or markets have been dominant in the emergence of new forms of money.
Whatever emerges as money in an economy becomes the general means of
payment. Prices of commodities, services, and bonds are expressed in units
of the money. Buyers use the money to purchase goods or bonds and sellers
receive the money is exchange for goods or bonds. We conclude that, at
this stage in its history, the ECU at best is an embryonic form of money,
closer to historical imaginary monies than to existing currencies that the
world has known.
Michael 0. Bordo Anna J. Schwartz
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Carnegie—Mellon University Economic Research
Pitsburgh, PA. 15213 New York, N.Y. 10003The ECU --AnImaginary or Embryonic Form of Money:
What Can We Learn from History?*
To find examples in history of new forms of money that can be compared
with the ECU, it is first necessary to define the attributes of the ECU
and to determine whether it is in fact a new form of money.
The ECU -is a Unit of account --anaccounting measure --basedon a
basket of currencies, the majority of which are linked by an exchange rate
agreement. The objective of the arrangement is to establish "a zone of
monetary stability" in Europe. Although the ECU was conceived as an offi-
cial unit, it has since its introduction acquired a private role.
Six functions of the official ECU have been identified (Vaubel 1980):
as a numeraire for parities; as a reference un-it for divergence of exchange
rates from parities; as a denominator for credit facilities; as a means of
settlement; as a solution to the nth currency problem; as the nucleus of a
European parallel currency. Only the final function is of special rele-
vance to this paper.
We first define the ECU in its official role before turning to develop-
ments in the private market for ECUs (section I). We then examine histori-
cal antecedents of three attributes of ECUs: a unit of account; a basket of
currencies; a basis for monetary integration (section II). We discuss
which features if any of ECUs are unique, and the contribution of the
historical analysis to assessing the future of ECUs (section III). We then
ask whether governments or markets have been dominant in the emergence of
new forms of money (section IV). Whatever emerges as money in an economy
becomes the general means of payment. Prices of commodities, services, and
bonds are expressed in units of the money. Buyers use the money to
purchase goods or bonds and sellers receive the money in exchange for goods—2—
or bonds. We conclude that, at this stage in its history, the ECU at best
is an embryonic form of money, closer to historical imaginary monies than
to existing currencies that the world has known. It may, however, succeed
in bringing about the preconditions of monetary unification before the EMS
develops fixed exchange rates. In that eventuality, the ECU can become a
full-fledged currency (section V).
I
The ECU, conceived as a unit of account, not a means of payment, and as
an official rather than private unit, came into existence on 13 March 1979
when the European Monetary System began operations. It was defined as a
basket of currencies that was a sum of specified amounts of nine EEC
currencies: DM, British pounds, French francs, Italian lire, Dutch guilder,
Belgian francs, Luxembourg francs, Danish krone, and Irish pounds. The
amounts were based on each country's share in intra-European trade, its
GNP, and its quota in the EEC's short-term monetary support arrangements.
The percentage shares of the currencies in the basket sum to 100.
The value of the ECU in terms of individual EEC currencies varies with
changes in intra—EEC exchange rate relationships. Each country declares a
central rate for its currency in terms of the ECU. The weights of the
currencies in the basket change with changes in exchange rate rela-
tionships. Compulsory intervention limits are fixed on either side of each
pair of currencies' bilateral central rates.
In September 1984, the composition of the basket was changed to offset
changes from various central rate realignments in the preceding five years.-3-
The Greek drachma was incorporated, although it, like the British pound,
does not participate in the exchange rate arrangements.
ECUs are created on a temporary basis through 3-month revolving swaps
with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund against the deposit of 20 per-
cent of each central bank's gold and dollar reserves, The quantity of ECUs
outstanding is variable since the market price of gold (valued at the
average ECU price in the preceding six months or of the two fixings on the
penultimate working day, whichever is lower) and the ECU value of the
dollar (prevailing two working days before) have been highly volatile.
Three—fourths of outstanding ECUs have been created against gold. Since
shares of gold and dollars in reserves of central banks differ signifi-
cantly, the distribution of ECU5 among them is strongly affected by change
in the valuation of the two reserve assets. The volume of ECUs created by
the revolving swaps amounted to ECU 23 billion at the start of EMS, reached
just under 50 billion in April 1981, then fell back to 42 billion in
December 1982, and increased to 51 billion in June 1985.
Neither debtor nor creditor central banks have found ECUs attractive
since they are inconvertible into other reserve assets, and limits exist,
though liberalized in 1985, on their usability within the EMS. Two-thirds
of interventions were in U.S. dollars through June 1985 (Micossi 1985,
331—2). Most interventions were intramarginal, not at the compulsory
intervention limits. The intramarginal ones were carried out in EC curren-
cies.
To expand the international role of the official ECU, in 1985 EMS
central banks were authorized to make a temporary exchange with the ECMF of—4--
ECUs for dollars or with other member central banks for EEC currencies.
Holding of ECUs by non-EEC central banks and specified international mone-
tary institutions was permitted. In addition, the interest rate calcula-
tion on official ECU holdings was raised from a weighted average of the
official discount rate in member countries to the weighted average of
money-market interest rates for the component currencies.
We do not have current information on whether these changes had the
effect of reversing the decline in official use of ECIJs that had occurred
by 1985.
In juxtaposition to what happened to official interest in the ECU,
unexpected private interest has developed, from zero in 1980 to $40 billion
in 1985, of which about one-fourth was in bonds denominated in ECUs, the
remainder in bank assets and liabilities. Though it has grown rapidly,
relative to the size of the Euromarket, the private market for ECUs remains
minuscule --e.g.,ECU loans and deposits represent 0.7 and 0.3 percent,
respectively, of total EEC bank assets and liabilities (Masera 1987, 9).
The issuers of ECU-denominated bonds include the World Bank, the
Republic of Italy, the European Investment Bank, the Council of Europe and
other official European institutions, Hydro Quebec, Citicorp, and French
public-.sector entities or firms (Lomax 1983, 178—9; BIS, 1984-5, 1,32).
Main buyers have been Belgian, Italian and French investors. Outside the
EEC, Swiss and Japanese have been buyers. Trading in ECU bonds is common
and settlement of trades is possible through a Brussels-based and a
Luxembourg—based clearing house. ECU deposits began in the interbank
market, available only to large customers. The banks had no possibility at—5—
the start of employing ECU deposits and unbundled the ECU into the nine
component currencies on the asset side of their balance sheets. With an
increase in the number of ECU depositors, the banks accepted smaller
accounts and also found a private market for borrowing in ECUs so that it
was no longer necessary to unbundle the ECU into the component currencies.
By 1984 some 200 banks participated in the ECU interbank market. The
nonbank deposit scope of the ECU banking sector expanded not only inside
but also outside the EEC countries. Only West Germany does not authorize
banks to accept ECU denominated deposits. All other countries permit banks
to accept both current and deposit accounts.
An important development was the agreement the BIS signed with the ECU
Banking Association in March 1986 to assume the functions of agent of the
private ECU clearing and settlement arrangement. Sometime in 1987 the
system is expected to begin operations. The BIS as agent of the clearing
banks will open and operate clearing accounts in their names, each of a
limited number of clearing banks having opened an ECU sight account at the
BIS.
Other uses of ECUs include the invoicing of foreign trade in some EEC
member countries which to some extent has been settled in ECUs as well as
in charges against credit cards, issuance of travelers' checks and custo—
mers' accounts in Benelux countries (BIS, 1984-5, 132-3). These may be
forerunners of pricing of goods and services generally in ECUs. More
significant would be customary settlement of ECU-denominated transactions
in ECUs, rather than the equivalent of a EEC currency or dollars.
The final question to consider is the reason for the development of the-6-
private market for ECU-denominated deposits and loans. One charac-
terization of the ECU is that it represents a form of financial innovation
(Levich 1987; Masera 1987). Private agents transact in ECUs rather than EC
national currencies, on this view, because the former provide greater port-
folio diversification, lower transaction costs, and access to a broader
market. The development of the private market for ECU-denominated deposits
and loans, however, is concentrated in countries with weak currencies, some
of which impose exchange and capital controls. The increase in nonbank
deposits has been concentrated in Belgium and Luxembourg, and
ECU-denominated loans in Denmark, France and Italy. All are countries with
relatively weak currencies, the latter three with capital controls (Greece
and Ireland also control capital movements).
Countries with weak currencies sometimes prohibit residents to open
foreign currency accounts or hold securities denominated in a foreign
currency. If that is not the case, private agents in weak currency
countries have an incentive to borrow ECUs because the exchange risk is
lower in that denomination than it would be if the loan were in DMs or
guilder. Borrowers in countries with high nominal interest rates may find
ECU5 a cheaper form of borrowing because of its lower interest cost
adjusted for expected changes in the exchange rate, and investors may find
ECUs attractive as an alternative to the dollar without being limited to
the low interest rates of the OM and Swiss franc. Borrowing in ECUs for
firms with affiliates in a number of EEC countries has apparently been less
costly than borrowing in their national currencies (BIS 1984-5, 132).
Treating the ECU as a foreign currency in member countries with foreign—7—
exchange controls would mean that the ECU would be subject to such
controls. In some countries, however, the ECU is exempt from foreign
exchange controls. This is clearly an incentive for residents of those
countries to acquire ECU-denominated loans and deposits. "In the present
system weak currency countries have to choose between the welfare losses
associated with capital controls and the losses arising from the volatility
of short-term interest rates, and, as the evidence shows, overwhelmingly
opt for the former. Thus capital controls appear to be an important
feature of the EMS, which allows weak currency countries to take part in
the exchange rate arrangement, without suffering from excessive domestic
interest rate fluctuations" (Giavazzi and Giovannini 1986, 21).
II
In this section we report historical antecedents based on three attribu-
tes of ECUs: a universal unit of account; a basket of currencies; a basis
for monetary integration.
1. A Universal Unit of Account
The ECU serves as a riumeraire or unit of account for the EMS. It pro-
vides a measuring rod into which the currencies and hence the price level
in terms of different currencies of the member countries can be easily
translated. Provision of a universal unit of account is indispensable in
the creation of a common currency. The ECU, however, is not widely used as
a means of payment, a second indispensable feature of a common currency.
A precedent for the separation of unit of account and medium of
exchange is exemplified by the "imaginary" or "ghost" monies that were-8-
known in Europe between the ninth and the eighteenth centuries. From the
reign of Charlemangne until the French revolution, across much of Europe a
distinction was commonly made between actual coins in circulation and
"imaginary" money --theaccounting system of pounds, shillings, and pence
in which prices were stated. In the medieval monetary system, coins were
minted in various weights and sizes, which had no value imprinted on them.
The monarch gave the coins official value in terms of the unit of account.
This distinction between the unit of account and means of payment is
not found in modern monetary systems where the two functions are embodied
in the same vehicle. The modern system, originally based on the specie
standard, defined the monetary unit as a fixed weight of some precious
metal, either gold, silver, or both. All coins, which had their values
imprinted on them, were multiples or fractions of this basic coin.
Fractional currencies, bank notes and bank deposits were all defined in
terms of the basic coin and were fully convertible into it. The present
fiduciary monetary system derives from the specie standard. Though
government-issued currency and bank deposits are no longer convertible -into
specie, the public has grown to treat them as if they were.
In the middle ages conditions were very different. In each state many
coins of different metals, of different weights and sizes, coined both at
home and abroad, circulated in common use. The diverse character of
medieval coinage reflected primarily the rudimentary nature of techniques
of minting and fragmented political power.1 In these conditions an
accounting system was necessary to translate values in terms of multiple
currencies into a common denominator. The system used was based on the-9-
ancient Roman denominations of pounds, shillings, and pence. Hence arose
the distinction between "real" and "imaginary" money.2
The medieval European monetary system was based on the Carolingian
reforms of the ninth century. Charlemagne established a currency system
consisting of a pound (livre) of silver, divided into 12 shillings (sols),
in turn divided into 12 pennies (deniers). In fact, only silver pennies
were minted.
Over time, as income and size of transactions increased, and as the
silver content of the penny declined (reflecting both deteriorating quality
and debasement), denominations larger than the penny became imperative. To
facilitate accounting, prices were denominated in terms of shillings and
pounds, even though no one had ever seen such coins.3and 4
Each country in Western Europe used the system of pounds, shillings,
and pence to keep accounts and as a standard of deferred payments. Thus
contracts, mortgages and bookkeeping were denominated in £,s. .d. Actual
payments were made in "real" money --gold,silver, copper, or vellum coins
(a mixture of copper and silver) --whosevalue in terms of the unit of
account was determined by the ruler.
As long as the official rating of coins corresponded to that of the
market, the system allowed gold, silver, and other types of coin to cir-
culate freely. Moreover, by adjusting the value of silver (or gold) coins
in terms of the unit of account, the circulation of both gold and silver
coins in a bimetallic standard could be maintained when the market ratio of
the two metals diverged from the official ratio.5 For example, if the
market silver/gold price ratio were to fall from, say, an official value of- 10-
12.1to 11.5:1, the ruler could increase (cry up or enhance) the official
value of the silver currency in terms of the unit of account, thereby
reducing the official bimetallic ratio to that of the market.
Bank money based on a given weight of gold or silver served as a form
of universal money since it could be rated in terms of the Unit of account
in each country and was more suitable than hard coin to make international
transfers. Thus the bank moneys of Venice, Genoa, and Amsterdam --conver-
tible into fixed weights of gold --wereused all over Europe.
In sum the system of imaginary money allowed every state to coin its
own currency, to use foreign coins, and to settle international payments
imbalances based on the universal unit of account. The ability of the
ruler to alter the value of a currency in terms of the unit of account
ultimately led to the demise of the imaginary money system. In the face of
persistent war, internal strife, and varying tax revenues, the rulers of
Europe, but especially France and Burgundy in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, repeatedly resorted to debasement and competitive devaluation.6
Once the public caught on and revenue from use of the "printing press"
declined, the ruler would introduce a "renforceinent" or currency reform
that started the process again.7 The record of monetary instability in
early modern France and other states set the stage for the integration of
the coinage and universal adoption of the specie standard.8
2. A Basket of Currencies
A second important attribute of the ECU is that it is a basket of
member country currencies, each currency entering with a fixed weight. The
basket or currency cocktail is designed to provide greater stability than— 11—
relianceon any one currency would. No direct historical antecedents to
the currency basket can be cited. The only antecedents are immediatepre-
decessors to the ECU. However, a number of arrangements are similar in the
sense that (a) they represent some composite of more than one currency; (b)
they are believed to promote greater price stability than would relying
solely on one currency. The arrangements to be discussed are: the
electrum; bimetallism; symmetallism; recent ECU predecessors.
(i) The electrum was a coin that was 75 percent gold, 25 percent silver,
used in Lydia, Asia Minor, circa, the sixth century B.C.It was apparently
used because the Greeks had not learned how to harden gold withcopper.
Use of this coin encountered problems with determining its gold and silver
content. Consequently, pure gold coins were preferred since they could be
assayed with a touchstone. Moreover, the ratio of gold to silver was not
legally defined (Burns 1927).
(ii) Bimetallic standards can be traced in rudimentary form back to the
Middle Ages. From Roman times the commercial world followed a silver stan-
dard, but with the evolution of international trade, gold coins, because of
their higher value, gained favor. By the mid-thirteenth century Venice
fixed the weights of both gold and silver coins, followed soon after by
other Italian city—states, and in the fourteenth century, by England,
France, and Burgundy (Cipolla 1965; Munro 1972).
Ultimately bimetallism was displaced by the gold standard. In the
period when it was in force --inFrance (1803-78), the United States
(1792-1834) -—itensured greater price stability than in the succeeding
period of gold monometallism.— 12
(iii) Alfred Marshall (1923, 1926) proposed symmetallism to the Gold and
Silver Commission in England in 1886 to solve the shortcomings of reliance
on precious metals, either gold or silver alone or b-imetallism.9 Under the
scheme currency would be exchangeable for a combination of gold and silver
bullion in fixed proportions. Marshall believed the scheme would provide a
stable monetary standard because the value of legal tender money would vary
with the mean of the values of both metals. The scheme was never adopted.1°
(iv) Monetary instability of the post-World War I period led to renewed
interest in a separate unit of account based on gold)1 Thus from its
inception in 1930 the Bank of International Settlements has based its
financial statement on an artificial currency until (ACU) that has a gold
weight of 0.29032 grains of fine gold per unit. Other international agen—
cies during the Bretton Woods era adopted separate units of account based
on the official gold content of the U.S. dollar. These included the
European Payments Union, which adopted it on July 1, 1950, the European
Unit of Account (EUA), with a gold weight of 0.88807 grains of fine gold
per unit, "which might, however, be changed by unanimous decision of the
OEEC Council in which no country would veto an appreciation, or depre-
ciation, no greater than that of its own currency since the inception of
theUnion"(Triffin 1979, 139), and thesucceedingEuropean Monetary
Arrangement of Dec. 27, 1958, which used the same measure; the original SDR
adopted on January 1, 1970; and a number of private arrangements.
With the advent of floating exchange rates in 1973, both official agen—
cies and private organizations began using an ACU based on the concept of a
basket of a number of currencies. The first such use of the basket concept- 13-
wasthe European Composite Unit (EURCO), first introduced in September 1973
by a group of eight European banks. The EURCO consisted of fixed amounts
of the currencies of the nine EC member countries. The country basket con-
cept of the EURCO was subsequently applied to the SDR in June 1974, the
Arab-Currency Related Unit (ARCRU) in November 1974, the Asian Monetary
Unit (AMU) in December 1974, and the European Unit of Account (EUA), the
immediate predecessor of the ECU, in March 1975.12
3. A Basis for Monetary Integration
The ultimate goal of the EMS is to create a uniform monetary system for
all the member countries of the EEC. Although the objectives of the
current monetary arrangements are much more modest, several historical
antecedents to monetary unification are of interest. We discuss two
regional examples --theLatin Monetary Union and the Scandinavian Monetary
Union —-andthe monetary unification of three nations -—Germany,Italy,
and the United States.
(a) Regional Monetary Unification
(1) The Latin Monetary Union, effective August 1866, formed by France,
Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy, and subsequently joined by additional mem-
bers, achieved its limited objective to standardize the fineness of curren-
cies of 5-franc pieces that were then issued by each of the countries on
the bimetallic standard. The coins in various other denominations as well
were to circulate freely throughout the union. However, a fall in the
price of silver led to the reduced coinage of standard silver pieces in
1874 and its discontinuation in 1878. Bimetallism's sun set, but the Union- 14-
wasnot formally dissolved until 1925.
(ii) A gold-based monetary union to replace the silver standard was created
by Denmark and Sweden in May 1873, and joined by Norway in October 1875.
The Scandinavian Monetary Union established a common currency unit, the
Scandinavian krona. The monetary agreement among the three participants
provided that gold coins, as well as common subsidiary silver and copper
coins, were legal tender in all of them, no matter in which country the
coins were minted. The three central banks accepted each other's notes at
par and settled balances through a clearing system. It has been noted that
no closer monetary cooperation was achieved by the union than would have
been the case had each country independently adopted the gold standard
(Jonung 1984). This conclusion holds if the only consideration is the
fixed exchange rates the gold standard sets. However, the monetary union
contributed the additional features of eliminating national currency
distinctions. The union was unofficially gradually dissolved by World War I,
officially not until after the war.
(b) National Monetary Unification
(i) In 1790, Germany consisted of 300 principalities. By 1871, all had
been integrated into one country (Kindleberger 1984, 117-20). The unifica-
tion process started with rationalization of the tariff structure and ended
with monetary unification. The Zoliverein treaty of 1833, creating a
customs union among the German states, made provision for the payment of
.customs duties in gold or silver coins of any of its members. Monetary
unification began with treaties -in 1837 and 1838 when the southern members— 15-
adoptedas a common monetary unit the gulden or florin, and the northern
tier of states adopted the Prussian thaler. This was followed in 1838 by
the Dresden convention which set the exchange rate between the Prussian
thaler and the gulden, and provided for minting a new common coin --the
VereinsmUrize, equal to two thalers or 3.5 gulden. The next stage in the
process occurred with the 1857 MUnzverein, which abandoned the Cologne mark
of silver for a Zollpfund (customs-union pound) of 500 grams, divided
metrically, and a simplified exchange rate of one thaler equal to 1.75
South German gulden. Finally, after an unsuccessful initiative in 1868 to
adopt the gold five-franc coin as the basic monetary unit, the Monetary
Reform of October 1871 introduced the mark, divided into 100 pfennings, as
the unit of account, established the ten-mark piece as the principal coin,
and linked Germany to the gold standard.
(ii) Like Germany, Italy at the beginning of the nineteenth century was
fragmented into a large number of political entities, all using separate
currencies based on different weights, metals, and systems of division
(Kindleberger 1984, 136—7). The unification process began with the
rationalization of tariffs in 1847, when the Kingdom of Sardinia, con-
sisting of Piedmont and Sardinia, joined with Tuscany and the Pontifical
States to form a single tariff unit. Currency unification came in stages.
Initially, four currencies (the lire of Piedmont and Parma, the Austrian
florin of Lombardy, and the Roman escudo) circulated; then by August 1862,
following the unification of Italy, the lira of the Kingdom of Sardinia
became the basis of a new currency.
(iii) In the early years of the Republic, though the U.S. coinage was- 16-
definedin terms of fixed weights of gold and silver, the principal media
of exchange were state bank notes. These notes often circulated at a
discount from par, especially in remote regions, reflecting the uncertainty
and the costs of redemption in specie. The Second Bank of the United
States was founded in 1816 for the express purpose of providing a uniform
national currency with the note issue everywhere convertible into specie.
From its inception until its demise in 1836 during the Bank War, the Second
Bank suceeded by the mid—1820s in creating a unified currency across the
country (Fraas 1974). It did so by limiting credit in the western branches
relative to the east and by forcing all its correspondent banks to redeem
their notes in specie. This policy quickly reduced the discount on western
notes and led to a convergence of price levels between the two regions.
III
The ECU is a unit of account based on a basket of currencies. A unit
of account separate from the medium of exchange is a throwback to imaginary
monies that existed for many centuries in the past. They were a market
response to a problem brought about by limited technology and fragmented
and weak political power --theproblem of making payments with coins of
diFferent weights, qualities, and units of measurement. The one element
relevant to the ECU in this explanation for the existence of imaginary
monies is the political dimension. It is not conditions of technology that
account for diverse national monies of EEC countries; for nationalistic
.reasons each country values its own historic forms of money. The ECU as a
unit of account is designed not to disturb that underlying reality.— 17-
Anotherelement common to imaginary money and the ECU is that actual
payments in settlement of transactions in each case were in the past and
are in the present made in currencies other than the unit of account.
The basket of currencies feature of the ECU is only relatively unique
since that feature was introduced in predecessors that date back to the
1970s. The historical arrangement that bears a resemblance to a basket of
currencies is bimetallism, which was successful for much of the nineteenth
century. It then enjoyed widespread international participation, but has
little to say about the future of the ECU. Symmetallism was an intellec-
tual construct that never saw the light of day.
From regional and national monetary unification experience, we learn
that a common money is achievable within a fixed exchange rate system.
National boundaries define a fixed exchange rate system. That is what a
national monetary unification signifies. A regional monetary unification
is embedded in a fixed exchange rate system. The Latin Monetary Union was
based on the bimetallic standard, the Scandinavian Monetary Union on the
gold standard. Neither outlasted the prevailing world monetary regimes in
which they were established.
Is there anything in the historical record that should lead an observer
to expect the ECU either (a) to become acceptable in payment in each member
country, even should national monies continue to exist, or (b) to supersede
national monies? The ECU is a creation of an exchange rate system that is
only temporarily fixed. Based on history, only in a truly fixed rate
exchange system does it seem to us that monetary unification based on the
ECU is conceivable. Yet, arguably, to establish a truly fixed exchange- 18-
ratesystem ab initio would impose unduly harsh conditions on the par-
ticipating countries. Hence establishment of a parallel currency such as
the ECU is an alternative prefiguring monetary unification, with fixing
exchange rates left to a later stage. Whether this strategy can succeed is
of great interest.
Iv
The historical evidence supports the proposition that markets and not
governments have been dominant in the emergence of new forms of money.
Commodity money was a market development. From earliest times private
coinage was known in many parts of the world. Nationalization of coining
was a later development for economic, political, or military reasons.
The financial innovation that was the prototype of all forms of inside
money dates back to the development of the banking business during the
early Renaissance in several important Italian cities. Individuals depo-
sited specie with a banker who did not acquire title to the funds but held
them as agent for the owner and charged a fee for storage.. A subsequent
development was the drawing of orders on the banker to pay some or all of
the deposit to a third party. Eventually, bankers learned that it was safe
to lend a portion of the deposits at interest. Depositors likewise learned
that deposit vouchers issued by bankers made out to individuals and trans-
ferable by endorsement served in place of specie as a medium of payment.
This was the origin of fractional reserve banking and fiduciary money.
Bankers no longer earned a fee for safekeeping specie but acquired title to
the funds left with them for use at their discretion, and earned interest
on loans they extended. Depositors received a rate of return that tended,— 19-
asa result of competition among bankers, to equal the interest revenue
less the bankers' cost of operation.
In England a parallel evolution occurred Goldsmiths were the first
bankers and goldsmith notes were the oldest form of banknotes in England.
By the time the Bank of England was established in 1694 -—thebankruptcy
of the goldsmiths on the suspension of payments by the Exchequer in 1672
(Horsef-leld 1982; Feavearyear 1931, 103) having set the stage for its
founding --banknotesthat it issued were hardly a new form of money. The
Bank at its founding was only a quasi-governmental institution.
Once banknotes became an established form of money that the private
sector willingly held, there was nothing to prevent the monetary authori-
ties from capturing the seigniorage from their issue. Thus the Bank of
England obtained a monopoly of the note issue within a 65-mile radius of
London in 1826 and throughout England in 1844. In Sweden, the Riksbank
gradually extended its monopoly over the note issue in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century with final prohibition of competing bank issues in
1897 (Jonung 1987).
Private initiatives converted instruments not originally designed to
serve as money to that use. An example is the postdated check. It was an
instrument that made it possible to circumvent usury laws. Drawn by the
debtor for the face value of the loan plus interest (at an unstated per-
cent) payable to the creditor at the due date, the postdated check was a
flexible form of credit expressed in odd amounts. When passed from hand to
hand with endorsements, the check served as money. Evasion of regulation
by creative private innovation of forms of money has a long history, to- 20-
whichfurther reference is made in what follows, including ECU-denominated
deposits and loans.
Another example of an instrument not originally designed to serve as
money that private agents converted to that use is the bill of exchange.
It has a very long history, dating to Babylonian times. Originally the
bill was an instrument that obligated the borrower who obtained one kind of
money to settle in the debt in a different kind of money --reminiscentof
using an ECU-denominated deposit to obtain a European currency other than
the local currency of the depositor? By the fourteenth century, however,
both the debt and its repayment were in one kind of money, payable at
fairs. Two centuries later the practice of endorsement gave added protec-
tion to the holder of the instrument, and thereafter endorsed inland bills
of exchange circulated as money in Italy, France, and later England.
In England endorsed bills of exchange for relatively small amounts of
£10 to £30 served as hand-to—hand currency --byprivate market action --
primarilyin the West Riding and Lancashire where no country banknotes cir-
culated. These bills could not, however, be used for making payments
outside those districts. With the establishment of joint stock banks after
1833, remittance first with their note issues and later by check was accom-
panied by the atrophy of the bill of exchange as means of payment --again
a private market action (see also Nishimura 1971, 29-30 on tax effects that
may account for a decline in the use of bills of exchange as hand-to-hand
currency).
The issue of Exchequer bills by England is another example of private
market use of the instrument as money. These were interest-bearing bills- 21
that acquired a secondary function as currency. Since they were not
payable on demand and therefore circulated at a discount, and were often
drawn for large and inconvenient amounts, private use of the bills as
currency did not long survive.
Another kind of private money innovation is exemplified by substitutes
that were introduced when government supply was inadequate. Merchants
issued lOUs during colonial times in the United States and later during
periods of restriction of payments by banks, that is, periods when govern-
ment issues of outside money did not match the demand for it. The
experience of colonial times was that transactions were occasionally con-
ducted by barter or shopnotes --notesissued by a merchant, redeemable by
him partly in money, partly in goods (Michener 1983). A multiple price
system emerged, with cash prices serving as the base, payments in shopnotes
raising the price, and prices for barter payments still higher. During
restriction of payments by banks, private clearinghouses monetized bank
assets by issuing hand-to-hand currency. In addition, emergency currency
issues that factories, corporations, and individuals paid out circulated.
The private issues may not have been new forms of money in a generic
sense, since they were essentially variants of hand-to-hand currency. More
recently, private markets have innovated new forms of money including the
emergence of negotiable certificates of deposit, Eurocurrency, and money
market deposit accounts. The innovation of money instruments seems to
occur when private agents attempt to eliminate or circumvent government
regulation or other constraints imposed on the financial firm (Silber 1975,
64—5).— 22—
Wheredoes the ECU fit in? The official ECU was the creation of an
official body. The private use of the ECU seems to us to be another case
of circumventing exchange and capital controls. If the ECU will eventually
emerge as a full-fledged money, it will not be because of "substantial sup-
port from international organizations and from national governments" (Lomax
1983, 312), except in the special sense of support by the participating
governments for a true fixed exchange rate system in the EEC. Private
agents may then decide to use the ECU in final payments as a parallel
European currency superseding the moneys of the individual member
countries.
Some have proposed the issue of an ECU coin to hasten the development
of a parallel currency. In our view that is not a crucial element. ECUs
could be book entries at banks and nonfinancial firms. The key requirement
is that they serve as final means of payment, not merely an accounting
measure that must be converted into a national currency in order to
discharge debts.
V
We have traced the development of the ECU both in its official use and
also the unexpected private interest in it as a unit of account in finan-
cial transactions. At this stage, the share of private ECUs in relation to
national and Eurocurrencies is minimal. A potentially important step in
encouraging further use of ECU-denominated bank loans and deposits is the
.forthcoming implementation of the BIS ECU bank clearing arrangement.
Our search for historical antecedents of the ECU hardly yielded a- 23—
substantialharvest. We concluded that the ECU as a unit of account bears
a resemblance to imaginary money that existed for nearly a millenium from
the ninth century on; as a basket of currencies was prefigured by mixed
commodity currency standards, actual or hypothetical, and was similar in
construction to more recent official and private currency cocktails; as a
scheme for monetary integration was differentiated from examples of mone-
tary integration within national boundaries and across regional boundaries
because these were all based on fixed exchange rates.
There did not seem to us to be particularly unique features in the
emergence of ECUs. The lessons of historical analysis that we stressed
were (1) the importance of the creation of a true fixed exchange rate
system in the EEC for the ECU to become a money that would be acceptable in
payment in each member country; (2) a Unit of account that is not also a
means of payment is only an intermediate stage in the development of a new
European money; (3) a basket of currencies is a reflection of the
unwillingness of the EMS to dispense with national currencies to achieve
monetary integration.
In examining the role of governments versus markets in theemergence of
new forms of money, we noted the preponderance of private initiatives
historically and contemporaneously -in introducing media of payment. The
incentives for the private sector to innovate in this respectappear to be
to free transactions from government controls and regulation as well as to
overcome other constraints on financial firms. Government has not been an
innovator in the emergence of money. We doubt that it is essential for the
EEC to coin ECUs as a means of expanding its role.— 24—
Privateuse of ECUs in weak-currency countries and in countries with
exchange and capital controls that do not apply to the ECU may have suf-
ficient momentum to continue, should controls be removed. The ECU may also
succeed as a 'ttrojan horsett in bringing about the preconditions of monetary
unification before the fixing of exchange rates. If that turns out to be
the shape of the future, the ECU in time can become a full-fledged currency
in a fixed-exchange rate EMS.—25—
Notes
*For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank Polly Allen, Paul De Grauwe,
Lars Jonung, David Laidler, Jacques Melitz, and Angela Redish.
1Before the invention of milling in the mid-seventeenth century, primi-
tive refining techniques caused coins to deteriorate quickly. In addition,
some rulers encountered difficulty in attracting sufficient bullion to the
mint. These factors combined with the small geographic size of the typical
European state enforced wide circulation of foreign coins. Medieval rulers
on occasion tried to ban the use of imported coin but were usually unsuc-
cessful.
2The following discussion of imaginary monies is based on Einaudi
(1936). For related experiences of primitive cultures, see Melitz (1974).
For a recent discussion of monetary systems that separated the unit of
account from the medium of exchange, see Cowen and Kroszner (1987, 574-5).
3Though occasionally money of account was pegged to a real coin equiva-
lent to a pound, shilling, or penny, such correspondence was accidental or,
if deliberate, did not last long.
4According to Cipolla (1956) the system of ghost monies arose because
rulers were unable to keep stable the relationship between coins of dif-
ferent denominations. Hence the public used the ghost reckoning system,
which by definition maintained a stable ratio between different denomina-
.tions and between the basic real penny.
5The value of silver rather than gold coins was altered because of the- 26—
prestigeattached to gold and because gold coins were more widely used in
international trade.
61n sharp contrast to Burgundy and France, England was a model of sound
money. After a Parliamentary prohibition of debasement in 1352, English
monarchs rarely engaged in the practice until the sixteenth century (except
periodically to offset deterioration in the quality of the coinage. See
Glassman and Redish 1987).
7See Bordo (1980) and the references therein.
8Alternatively, it may be argued that the adoption of the specie stan-
dard in the eighteenth century made obsolete the system of imaginary money.
The adoption of the specie standard was neither uniform nor uneventful.
For example, in the British American colonies in the eighteenth century,
though the unit of account was -in £.s.d., because of a prohibition against
the export of British coin, the principal means of payment was the Spanish
dollar or piece oF eight. These coins were defined in terms of the colo-
nial money and given legal tender status. See Michener (1987).
9Marshall's criticism of monometallism was that changes in demand
(rising real income and a preference for gold) and supply (improved tech-
nology and discoveries of precious metals) conditions made the use of gold
or silver unsuitable to provide long-run price stability. His criticism of
bimetall-ism was that changes in relative costs of production would lead to
continuous shifts towards the lower-cost metal, thus producing more insta-
.b-il-ity than relying on one metal alone (1923, p. 63).
10Marshall (1923) also proposed a tabular scheme. Jevons (1875) earlier— 27-
proposeda similar scheme (Laidler 1982). Fisher proposed a scheme for a
compensated dollar (1922 [1965], 498). Einaudi argued that the system of
imaginary money could be used in a similar manner. He proposed that the
ruler cry up the currency when the price level fell below some stated limit
and cry it down when prices rose above it.
11The following draws heavily on Ascheim and Park (1976).
12Baskets were also privately arranged: the B—Unit (Barclay's Unit) and
the Credit Lyonnais International Financial Unit (IFU).
t3For the experience of other countries, see Vaubel (1984).- 28-
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